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My dissertation aims to answer two questions: (1) Is democracy epistemically valuable? (2) Is the epistemic
value of democracy, if it has any, necessary for justifying its legitimacy? I argue that democracy in certain
form can be epistemically valuable. However, I also argue that the epistemic value of democracy is not
necessary for justifying its legitimacy. To defend the epistemic value of democracy, I propose a post-
deliberation version of Condorcet’s jury theorem. I argue that this version of the jury theorem can avoid the
common challenges against the classic version. To reject the necessity of epistemic value for democratic
legitimacy, I argue that, given that the epistemic value of democracy is subject to disagreement, it cannot
be used to justify legitimacy. In addition, I provide a purely proceduralist argument for democratic
legitimacy, which appeals to the egalitarian principle that every citizens ought to be equally respected by
the state. This argument, if succeeds, shows that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for
justifying democratic legitimacy.
